Publications

The preceding articles in this series established the threat, identified the kill chain, and derived the platform architecture from engagement geometry. This final article addresses the operational layer: how individual ULAQ ADW units are organised into a coordinated defensive system, and how that system is operated to protect fixed critical infrastructure, and Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) against OWA drones.

The sensors and effectors identified in the previous article define what the ADW platform must carry. The engagement geometry of the SAL and IR/IIR Precision-Guided Light Missiles defines how it must operate. Together, these constraints produce an unambiguous answer to the platform question - one that conventional manned vessels cannot satisfy at scale, and that points to a specific configuration of unmanned surface combatants: ULAQ ADW.

Effective Anti-Drone Warfare demands a complete kill chain — detection, identification, tracking, and hard-kill engagement — in which every link is matched to the specific physics and economics of the Tier 2 OWA drone threat. This article examines the technology options for each link: why only AESA radar meets the detection requirement, what the electro-optic director must deliver for identification and fire control, and how the principal effector classes compare against the demands of the ADW mission.

The proliferation of autonomous one-way attack drones has exposed a critical gap in defence architecture: Anti-Drone Warfare (ADW) is neither conventional air defence nor C-UAS. It is a distinct operational domain — with unique threat physics, unique engagement economics, and unique platform requirements. For maritime environments, that gap is structural and cannot be closed by shore-based systems alone.